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Although Europe in the aggregate is a not a major contributor to global current account 
imbalances, its trade and financial linkages with the rest of the world mean that it will still be 
affected by a shift in the current configuration of external deficits and surpluses. We assess 
the macroeconomic impact on Europe of global current account adjustment under alternative 
scenarios, emphasizing both trade and financial channels. Finally, we consider heterogeneous 
exposure across individual European economies to external adjustment shocks. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Economic globalization has been one of the major trends shaping the world economy in 
recent years. On the real side, international trade has expanded substantially, with the 
emerging Asian countries in general, and China in particular, taking a prominent role. On the 
financial side, international capital flows have increased even more rapidly than product 
trade, leading to a remarkable rise in cross-border holdings of assets and liabilities. These 
developments imply tighter real and financial linkages across countries and regions, with 
attendant implications for the transmission of shocks and co-movements in macroeconomic 
variables.  
Increased international trade and capital mobility have the potential to provide economic 
benefits through a more efficient international allocation of production and capital and 
greater cross-border risk diversification. They may also have facilitated the financing of 
larger and more persistent current account imbalances—more specifically, unprecedented 
U.S. trade and current account deficits and sizable surpluses in emerging Asia and oil 
exporters. While there is a lively debate on how long trade and current account imbalances of 
this size can persist, it is clear that a potential sharp correction of such imbalances is a source 
of risk that, in an era of financial globalization, stretches beyond those countries that must 
reduce external gaps and also extend to those countries that are linked through trade and 
finance to the adjusting economies. Accordingly, our goal in this paper is to assess the 
potential impact on Europe of a reduction in external imbalances across the world’s major 
economic regions.  
Although the euro area—and Europe, taken in the aggregate—are in approximate external 
balance, a reduction in global current account imbalances could still have a major impact on 
the European economy. A contraction in the U.S. deficit and the surpluses run by Asia and 
oil exporters would involve a shift in the global distribution of expenditure, with attendant 
implications for exchange rates and the level and composition of production in the major 
economic regions. European economies will be affected by these external developments 
through an array of trade and financial linkages, with potential implications for 
macroeconomic policy, especially in the event of a sudden movement in the external 
environment. 
To focus our analysis, we examine a range of alternative scenarios by which global current 
account adjustment may take place. We consider three alternatives: a ‘soft landing’ scenario 
in which trade and current account imbalances are reduced gradually, and no major policy 
change occurs; a ‘disruptive’ scenario in which the United States ceases to attract large-scale 
capital inflows at a low interest rate; and a ‘policy action’ scenario in which adjustment is 
facilitated by policy changes in the major economic regions. We explore these scenarios 
using the Global Economic Model (GEM), a micro-founded dynamic general equilibrium 
model of the world economy developed at the International Monetary Fund.   3 
A particular innovation in our contribution is to analyze the role of both trade and financial 
linkages in the adjustment process. The acceleration of financial globalization in recent years 
means that gross holdings of external assets and liabilities are now much larger than in 
previous adjustment episodes, such as the turnaround in the U.S. current account deficit in 
the late 1980s. In turn, as pointed out in a number of recent contributions, this implies that 
changes in exchange rates and asset prices will have significant repercussions on the value of 
countries’ external assets and liabilities (the so-called “valuation effects”), in addition to the 
effects operating through the trade balance and current account.  
From a European perspective, the increase in holdings of foreign assets and liabilities in 
recent years means that the transmission mechanism by which external adjustment in the 
U.S. affects Europe has changed. In particular, in addition to trade linkages and net capital 
flows, the balance sheets of European firms, governments, and households will be affected 
by the changes in exchange rates and asset prices that are likely to accompany the adjustment 
process. In light of the fact that scenarios involving a narrowing in the U.S. trade deficit are 
characterized by a depreciation of the U.S. dollar in real effective terms, we quantify the net 
dollar exposure of the major economic regions and provide estimates of the implications of 
dollar adjustment for the value of their external holdings.  
After considering the implications of external adjustment for Europe as a whole, and the euro 
area in particular, we turn our focus to individual European national economies. In particular, 
we seek to ascertain which economies may be most affected by changes in international trade 
patterns and in international financial markets that may accompany current account 
adjustment. To do so, we examine differences across the individual national economies in 
their trade and financial linkages vis-à-vis the United States, as well as in their external 
positions: while aggregate Europe is in broad balance, some national economies are running 
deficits that are proportionally bigger than the U.S. deficit, while others are major surplus 
countries.  
The main findings of our analysis are as follows. First, there has been a shift in the pattern of 
co-movement between the U.S. and European external positions. While European and 
American current account balances have historically been negatively correlated, the 
correlation has been positive over the last decade—with the U.S. deficit largely financed by 
Asia and, in recent years, the oil-exporting nations. On the other hand, the negative co-
movement between the net foreign asset positions of Europe and the United States has 
become stronger over the last decade, reflecting the increased importance of the valuation 
channel and the financial impact of currency movements.  
Second, the weakening of the U.S. dollar likely to accompany a reduction in the U.S. trade 
deficit would have a non-negligible negative wealth effect on European investors, by 
reducing the value of their dollar-denominated claims. However, this effect would likely be 
smaller than in China and Japan, that hold larger net dollar positions. Third, there is 
considerable heterogeneity across Europe (and within the euro area) both in terms of net  4 
positions and bilateral financial holdings in the United States. Accordingly, to the extent that 
a contraction in global imbalances accompanied by a shift in the global financial 
environment (e.g. an increase in global interest rates) and in U.S.-specific asset and currency 
values, this may have differential wealth and cyclical effects across Europe. 
This work relates to several recent contributions on the international adjustment process.
2 On 
the empirical side, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001; 2005; 2006; 2007b) have shown the 
importance of valuation effects in explaining the evolution of net foreign asset positions for a 
large number of countries. In relation to the United States, Gourinchas and Rey (2005) have 
highlighted the role played by the valuation channel in stabilizing the external position, while 
Tille (2003) and Gourinchas and Rey (2007) have developed a detailed sectoral 
decomposition of the sources of valuation effects. A particularly valuable contribution for 
our purposes is Tille (2005), who constructs estimates of the currency composition of the 
international balance sheet of the United States.  
In terms of theoretical contributions, our model simulations closely follow Faruqee, Laxton, 
Muir, and Pesenti (2007). Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000, 2005, 2007) have developed a simple 
analytical framework that allows them to quantify the scale of exchange rate adjustment 
associated with a closing of current account balances. Of these, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) 
is the closest to our own work in specifying a three-region model of the world economy and 
allowing for the operation of the valuation channel. Cavallo and Tille (2006) have extended 
this contribution by allowing for gradual adjustment in the external account, with the pace of 
current account adjustment influenced by valuation dynamics. Blanchard, Giavazzi and Sa 
(2005) also incorporate the valuation channel in a portfolio-balance model that allows for 
imperfect substitutability of assets across countries.  
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the evolution of 
global current account balances and net foreign asset positions in recent years, with special 
attention paid to the co-movements between the European and U.S. external positions. In 
addition, it documents the scale and pattern of international trade and financial integration, 
highlighting in particular the bilateral linkages between Europe and the United States. 
Section III reports results from a number of adjustment scenarios produced by the GEM, 
which include a correction for the role played by the valuation channel. The impact of 
heterogeneity across individual European economies in section IV. Finally, we discuss the 
options available to policymakers in minimizing the risk of a hard-landing scenario and offer 
some conclusions in Section V. 
                                                 
2 The 2006 report by the European Economic Advisory Group provides an excellent overview.  5 
II.   EUROPE’S EXTERNAL POSITION IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 
In this section we consider the evolution of the current account balance of European 
countries taken as a group, as they relate to global trends, as well as the degree of trade and 
financial integration of Europe with the rest of the world in general, and the United States in 
particular.  
A.   Current Account Balances: Stylized Facts 
The much-debated topic of global current account imbalances is usefully summarized by 
Figure 1, which plots the current account balances of Europe and the United States together 
with those of countries/regions that are running significant current account surpluses. Current 
account balances are expressed in relation to world GDP, so as to provide a perspective on 
their global relevance. The Figure shows that surpluses in emerging Asia, Japan, and more 
recently oil exporters have been the main counterpart to the widening U.S. current account 
deficit. In contrast, there has been broad balance in the current account of Europe (and the 
euro area) throughout the period.  
In order to understand the likelihood that these trends will continue and the possible 
consequences of their reversal, it is useful to relate them to the evolution of current account 
balances over a longer time period, focusing more specifically on Europe and the United 
States. Accordingly, Figure 2 plots the current account and net foreign asset positions over 
1970–2006 for aggregate Europe (with the euro area also shown) and the United States, 
scaled by their respective GDP levels. Over the entire period, there is clearly a negative co-
movement between the current accounts of the two regions; this is especially clear during the 
mid-1980s, when the European current account surplus grew in mirror image to the 
deterioration of the U.S. external balance, reflecting in particular the sizable current account 
surplus in Germany. However, the last decade has seen a noticeable shift—the late 1990s saw 
the United States and Europe simultaneously undergo a deterioration in the current account 
balance, with positive co-movement also seen during the 2001 growth slowdown and again 
in 2005–06. While the correlation in current account balances was -0.68 during 1970–1995, it 
has been positive at 0.40 during 1996–2006—a striking reversal.  
Figure 3 provides an additional perspective by charting the current account balance of the 
aggregate of the United States and Europe. It shows that the collective deficit has never been 
as large as the current value—around 3 percent of GDP in 2006, twice as much as in the mid-
1980s—reflecting the large deficit in the United States. Adding Japan to the picture does not 
change the main message, despite the strong negative co-movement between its current 
account balance and the one of the United States. Namely, the combined current account  6 
balance of Europe, Japan, and the United States was close to balance in the mid-1980s and 
shows a significant deficit today.
3
We turn now to the implications of these trends in current account balances for the creditor 
and debtor position of Europe and the United States. Current account surpluses imply net 
capital outflows—purchases of foreign assets by domestic residents, including the Central 
Bank, exceed foreign residents’ purchases of domestic assets. Hence countries running 
surpluses should see an improvement in their net external position and countries running 
deficits should see a worsening. Figure 4 plots the net external asset positions of Europe and 
the United States. In light of the current account developments depicted in Figures 1 and 2, 
one feature is particularly striking—namely, during 2002–2005 the net foreign asset position 
of Europe deteriorated and the position of the United States improved slightly, despite the 
fact that Europe ran current account surpluses and the United States ran deficits. It is well 
known that exchange rate and asset price changes cause fluctuations in the value of external 
assets and liabilities—the so-called valuation effects—which are unrelated to the underlying 
current account developments.
4 Hence Figures 1 and 4, taken together, suggest that these 
valuation effects have been moving in opposite directions for Europe and the United States. 
Indeed, the change in the bilateral euro/dollar exchange rate since early 2002 has been very 
significant. In sub-section C, we look more closely at the factors underlying these valuation 
effects by documenting the evolution of Europe’s degree of international financial integration 
with the world economy in general, and the United States in particular, and reviewing the 
role of the valuation channel in driving the dynamics of net foreign asset positions in recent 
years.  
B.   Trade Linkages 
The extent of trade between countries is an important indicator of the extent of international 
interdependence: all else equal, a country is more exposed to a shock in some partner 
country, the greater is the extent of trade linkages between the countries. Accordingly, in this 
sub-section, we briefly discuss the extent of trade integration between Europe, the United 
States, and the rest of the world.  
Table 1 shows the volumes of bilateral trade in goods (as a ratio to the GDP of the ‘home’ 
country or region) in 1984 and 2004 (comparable data on services in unfortunately not 
available). Aggregate trade volumes have generally increased in the last two decades, the 
                                                 
3 See Faruqee (2004) for a related discussion. The current account balance in Japan has historically shown a 
strong positive co-movement with the European current account balance, which has disappeared over the past 
decade, while the negative co-movement with the U.S. current account balance has persisted.  
 
4 The current account balance includes investment income earned on assets and paid out on liabilities, but not 
changes in the value of assets and liabilities due to asset price fluctuations. See for example, Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2005a, b) and Gourinchas and Rey (2005a).   7 
most striking development being the growth in trade with emerging Asia. For the euro area, 
direct trade with the United States is relatively small and—scaled by GDP—has not 
increased much over the past 20 years. Indeed, emerging Asia is now as important a trading 
partner as the United States for the euro area, despite being only ⅓ the size of the United 
States. (Similarly, Europe and emerging Asia are broadly similar in importance as trading 
partners for the United States.) 
Accordingly, the direct macroeconomic impact on Europe of a slowdown in the United States 
(or a switch in expenditures away from imports towards domestically-produced goods) 
through the trade channel is necessarily limited in magnitude, even if this would certainly be 
a significant shock for the European traded goods’ sector.  
However, bilateral trade volumes understate the full impact of the trade channel—U.S. and 
European firms compete in third markets and an expansion in U.S. exports triggered by a 
dollar depreciation would pose a competitive threat to European exporters.
5 In addition, the 
impact on trade flows of a strengthening of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar would depend on 
what happens to the euro’s real effective exchange rate. In particular, the impact of dollar 
depreciation on Europe will depend on whether the currencies of China and other countries in 
emerging Asia (as well as oil exporters) strengthen against the dollar. We will return to this 
issue in the next section when we describe the model scenarios. 
The table also highlights how important trade links with the United States (as well as with 
Japan and Europe) are for the emerging Asia region, in relation to its GDP. Therefore, as 
discussed in Eichengreen and Park (2006), the direct effect of a decline in U.S. demand for 
imports would—ceteris paribus—be felt much more strongly in emerging Asia than for 
Europe. 
C.   Financial Linkages 
Financial linkages represent a second key form of macroeconomic interdependence. Along 
one dimension, an important form of financial interdependence is provided by co-movements 
in asset pricing, where shifts in financial returns in one region influence financial returns in 
other regions. Here, we focus on the extent of cross-border holdings of assets and 
liabilities—if domestic investors are net holders of an asset or currency issued by another 
country, they will be directly affected by shifts in the value of that asset or currency.
6 
Accordingly, as shown in the accounting framework presented in Appendix 1, the volume of 
                                                 
5 The weight of the United States in the IMF’s real effective exchange rate index of the euro area, which takes 
into account third-market effects, is around 20 percent, equal to the aggregate weight of Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom. See Bayoumi, Lee, and Jayanthi (2005). 
6 See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) on the rationale for using this ratio as a volume-based indicator of 
international financial integration.  8 
cross-border holdings is an important indicator of the importance of exchange rate and asset 
price changes for the value of countries’ net external position.  
Figure 5 plots the level of cross-border assets and liabilities (expressed as a ratio to GDP) for 
the aggregate European economy over 1984–2004 (which includes intra-European cross-
holdings) on the left scale; in addition, it shows the evolution of the level of bilateral assets 
and liabilities between Europe and United States on the right scale. The figure confirms that 
financial globalization has grown rapidly – the ratio of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP 
has grown by a factor of 3.5 over 1984–2004 (from 130 percent to over 450 percent). The 
figure also shows that the bilateral financial position vis-à-vis the United States has grown at 
only a marginally slower pace. This suggests that the importance for the wealth of European 
investors of movements in the value of U.S. assets and the dollar against European currencies 
has grown sharply over this period.
7  
In terms of the overall international investment position, the United States accounted for only 
17 percent of the aggregate cross-border holdings of Europe in 2004, reflecting the 
predominance of intra-European cross-holdings in the total. However, the United States is by 
far the most important extra-European destination for European investors: for instance, 
according to ECB data, it accounted in 2005 for 36 percent of the foreign equity holdings of 
euro area investors and 32 percent of the foreign bond holdings (the shares for FDI and other 
investment are lower at 21 percent and 14 percent respectively). 
In summary, then, the United States is the major extra-European destination for outward 
investment from Europe, with the scale of the engagement growing rapidly over the last two 
decades. These financial linkages provide a potentially important transmission mechanism by 
which fluctuations in financial returns in the United States affect the wealth of European 
investors—we probe the role of such valuation shocks in the international adjustment process 
in the next subsection and in subsection III.D below. 
D.   The Dynamics of Net Foreign Asset Positions: A Decomposition 
In the preceding discussion, we have highlighted that the evolution of net external positions 
depends not only on whether the country is accumulating net external assets or liabilities 
through current account surpluses or deficits, but also on changes in the value of its external 
portfolio driven by valuation effects. As is shown in the accounting framework laid out in 
Appendix 1, the change in the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP can be decomposed into 
several factors: the trade balance, net investment income, net capital gains (valuation effects), 
                                                 
7 The data underlying this figure are based on the geographical distribution of foreign assets and liabilities. As 
we will emphasize in the next section, there is an important distinction between the geography of international 
investment and its currency composition – in particular, the importance of the dollar is not exactly equal to the 
scale of investment in the United States. Martin and Rey (2000, 2004) provide a theoretical framework to 
understand the geographical allocation of portfolio investment.  9 
the effects of growth (since GDP is in the denominator of the ratio) and, finally, capital 
account transfers and errors and omissions. Table 2 provides such a decomposition of the 
changes in net foreign asset positions between the end of 2001 and the end of 2005 for the 
United States, Japan, and the euro area.  
Despite running a large cumulative trade deficit, the United States actually enjoyed a slight 
improvement in its ratio of net foreign asset to GDP during this period. This can be mainly 
attributed to large capital gains but positive net investment income (despite being a net 
debtor) and good economic growth were also positive contributory factors.
8 In contrast, the 
euro area ran a cumulative trade surplus but capital losses and negative net investment 
income flows meant that its net liability position doubled in size during this period. Other 
European countries, such as Switzerland and the United Kingdom, also experienced 
valuation losses during this period. Finally, the Japanese net foreign asset position relative to 
GDP was little changed, with the sizeable current account surplus (consisting of surpluses in 
both the trade balance and net investment income) offset by capital losses.  
Table 3 provides some clues as to the sources of these capital gains and losses for the euro 
area and the United States by showing the local-currency rates of capital gain (that is, capital 
gains divided by the initial stock of assets) in selected investment categories.
9 For the euro 
area, capital gains on portfolio debt liabilities exceeded capital gains on portfolio debt 
assets—since the euro area has a negative net position in portfolio debt, this contributed to 
aggregate capital losses. Capital gains on FDI liabilities also exceeded capital gains on FDI 
assets, although the impact of this differential was attenuated by the small positive net FDI 
position of the euro area. Finally, capital gains on portfolio equity assets exceeded capital 
gains on portfolio equity liabilities. However, the euro area has a substantial negative net 
position in the portfolio equity category (about 7 percent of GDP), so that the net impact was 
negative on the overall position. In contrast, the United States enjoyed a superior capital 
gains differential in all investment categories. Furthermore, its long position in FDI and 
portfolio equity meant that high average returns in these categories fed strongly into the 
aggregate position. 
Finally, Table 3 shows that the euro-dollar exchange rate plays an important role in 
determining the returns the euro area earns on its foreign assets. For instance, there is a close 
correspondence between the euro-denominated capital gains earned on foreign portfolio 
equity assets and the sum of the dollar-denominated capital gains on U.S. portfolio equity 
                                                 
8  For a net debtor country, like the United States, faster economic growth will reduce the size of net external 
liabilities relative to GDP. Conversely, for creditor countries faster growth will reduce the size of their net 
external assets relative to GDP. 
9 A limitation is that the data on FDI for the euro area is calculated at book value, rather than market value, 
During periods of significant changes in stock market prices, this will underestimate the size of capital gains 
and losses in this category.  10 
liabilities and the rate of dollar-euro appreciation, reflecting the importance of portfolio 
equity investment by the euro area in the United States. Although the bulk of the euro area’s 
external holdings are in other European countries, the currencies of these countries are much 
more stable vis-à-vis the euro—the dollar is the dominant foreign-currency exposure faced 
by the euro area. 
III.   INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENT 
In the previous section we have highlighted a number of stylized facts concerning the 
evolution of global current account imbalances and international financial integration. In 
particular, we have highlighted that Europe in the aggregate has a broadly balanced current 
account position, and—relative to its GDP—trades less with the United States than other 
regions of the world (particularly emerging Asia). We have also highlighted that financial 
linkages between Europe and the United States have grown substantially over the past two 
decades, and may therefore amplify the transmission of shocks from one region to the other. 
In this section, we take a general equilibrium perspective and discuss how a change in the 
pattern of global current account imbalances—and its attendant implications for 
macroeconomic variables, including exchange rates—may affect the European economy.  
While there is considerable debate on the extent to which the current pattern of global trade 
and current account imbalances in general, and the United States current account deficit in 
particular, should be cause for concern, there is little doubt that the United States cannot run 
a trade deficit of 6 percent of GDP forever, and that the adjustment process is likely to entail 
a realignment in international relative prices. However, views differ on many other aspects of 
the adjustment process, including the likelihood that the current pattern of international 
borrowing and lending could continue for a while, the risks of a costly adjustment, the 
magnitude of the needed adjustment in exchange rates, and the ‘trigger’ for the adjustment.  
For example, it is possible to envisage a “soft-landing” scenario where the United States 
continues to experience substantial net capital inflows, trade and current account imbalances 
are slowly reduced, factors are gradually reallocated from the non-traded to the traded sector 
in a smooth fashion, and exchange rate adjustment also occurs gradually. Such a scenario 
need not involve any persistent deviation from potential output, with the gradual shift in the 
composition of demand mirrored by the required inter-sectoral reallocation of capital and 
labor. At the other extreme, a “hard-landing” scenario—possibly triggered by a shift in 
investors’ preferences away from U.S. assets—could involve a more rapid unwinding of 
current imbalances, accompanied by significant swings in exchange rates with possible 
disruptive effects on financial markets and economic activity.  
At a qualitative level, the implications for Europe of these scenarios are well understood. An 
appreciation of the euro against the dollar would reduce the competitiveness of European 
exporters vis-à-vis U.S. firms in global markets, while a growth slowdown in the United 
States would lower external demand for European exports. As for financial market variables,  11 
a decline in U.S. asset values and the dollar would reduce the value of European investment 
positions in the United States. In the short run, the ensuing contractionary impact on 
domestic output of these developments could be offset by a compensatory increase in 
domestic demand and/or by an increase in external demand from other parts of the world. In 
this regard, measures to support domestic demand and raise the level of potential output are 
heavily debated in policy circles, with a weakening of the euro vis-à-vis Asian currencies in 
real terms also perceived as an important part of the adjustment process.  
A.   Unwinding of Global Imbalances—A Model-Based Perspective 
To provide a quantitative perspective on an unwinding of global imbalances, we present 
adjustment scenarios based on the IMF’s Global Economic Model (GEM), a state-of-the-art 
multi-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. We then integrate this analysis, 
which does not explicitly allow for valuation effects, with simulations capturing the extent to 
which the exchange rate adjustments predicted by the model affect the external position of 
countries. In particular, we focus on three possible scenarios featuring a reduction in the U.S. 
current account deficit, which span some of the views discussed in the literature and alluded 
to in the previous sub-section.  
•  The first is a ‘benign’ scenario in which an increase in the U.S. private saving rate 
gradually reduces the U.S. trade and current account deficits. The mirror image of the 
slow adjustment in the U.S. current account is the willingness of other countries to 
continue to purchase U.S. assets.  
•  The second is a disruptive scenario, characterized by a decline in the level of 
competition worldwide and a sudden decline in foreigners’ willingness to hold U.S. 
assets, with large changes in exchange rates and a significant output decline in the short 
run.  
•  The third scenario features instead joint policy action by the major ‘players,’ designed to 
facilitate the reduction in global imbalances and supporting growth.  
The interested reader will find a detailed technical description of model and scenarios in 
Faruqee, Laxton, Muir, and Pesenti (2007). 
B.   A Brief Description of the Model 
The model has four regions: the United States; the euro area and Japan; Emerging Asian 
economies; and the rest of the world.
10 Each region produces both tradable and nontradable 
                                                 
10  Disaggregating the euro area and Japan would of course be a desirable but computationally very complex 
extension. This issue is further discussed below. Faruqee (2004) discusses scenarios of global current account 
adjustment using an earlier three-region version of GEM calibrated on the United States, the euro area, and the 
rest of the world.   12 
goods using capital, labor, and intermediate inputs, with constant elasticity of substitution 
production functions. Bilateral trade flows take place between the blocks—relevant share 
parameters are calibrated so as to ensure that the model broadly replicates actual trade flows 
among the major areas. Goods and labor markets are imperfectly competitive and subject to 
nominal rigidities. There are two types of consumers: liquidity-constrained ones that 
consume their disposable income, and forward-looking consumers that are non-Ricardian—
that is, they treat a portion of government debt as net wealth. The model also includes an 
array of adjustment costs in consumption and labor supply (habit persistence), investment, 
and the composition of trade so as to ensure that it reasonably matches data properties at 
business-cycle frequencies.  
Monetary policy in the United States, the Japan-euro area block, and the rest of the world is 
characterized by an interest rate feedback rule à la Taylor that gradually moves inflation 
toward to a constant desired rate. In the first scenario, monetary policy in emerging Asia is 
geared towards maintaining a fixed exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar. In the other scenarios 
emerging Asia is assumed to abandon the exchange rate peg and adopt a monetary policy 
rule similar to the one in the other regions. In all countries, fiscal policy is aimed at 
stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio over the medium term. 
There is free capital mobility between regions, with one international bond being traded 
internationally. The interest rate parity condition is augmented by a country-specific risk 
premium, whose size depends on the difference between actual and desired net foreign 
assets. Therefore, desired holdings of net foreign assets (or foreign liabilities) in each region 
over the medium term play a key role in determining the equilibrium level of current account 
balances and exchange rates. In the long run, motivated by assumptions about demography 
and productivity differences, the United States is assumed to be the only debtor region, with 
the remaining regions holding positive net foreign assets. The model features a decline in the 
medium-term rate of productivity growth in emerging Asia, as its income level approaches 
the one in more advanced economies, and a decline in output growth in Japan and the euro 
area, reflecting demographic trends. 
In the model, the current set of imbalances are assumed to reflect primarily saving behavior 
by both the private and public sector, rather than investment dynamics fueled by 
(excessively) optimistic productivity and growth expectations as in the second half of the 
1990s. More specifically, the two main driving forces behind the current account dynamics 
are temporarily low private and public savings in the United States, together with a portfolio 
preference shock generating strong demand for U.S. assets abroad, particularly in Emerging 
Asia. Both contribute to the U.S. current account deficit, the latter by reducing the rate of 
return required by foreigners in order to hold U.S. assets.
11
                                                 
(continued…) 
11 Hunt and Rebucci (2003) discuss the role of this channel in explaining the emergence of the U.S. current 
account deficit. This ‘risk premium’ in other smaller and less-developed countries typically rises as net external  13 
Clearly parameter values play an important role in shaping the response of the world 
economy to the various shocks. While we refer the reader to Faruqee et al. (2005) for details 
on model parametrization, we highlight here two parameter values that help interpret the 
quantitative features of the model.  
•  The first key parameter is the elasticity of substitution between domestically-produced 
and foreign-produced traded goods, which influences the extent of relative price 
adjustment necessary to induce a change in the relative consumption of these goods. In 
line with the calibration of most large macroeconomic models, this elasticity is chosen to 
be 2.5—a value which is higher than the one that would be consistent with 
macroeconomic evidence on the response of imports and exports to real exchange rate 
fluctuations (albeit lower than the one that microeconomic estimates of responses of 
trade to relative prices suggest).
12 As a result, the adjustment in real effective exchange 
rates associated with reduced external current account imbalances is generally smaller 
relative to other model-generated estimates in the literature (such as, for example, 
Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005, 2007), and Krugman 
(2007)). 
13 
•  The second parameter captures the extent of “non-Ricardian” behavior—that is, the 
extent to which consumers that are forward-looking treat their holdings of public debt as 
net wealth. In line with results obtained from a calibration of a finite-horizon DSGE 
model (Kumhof, Laxton, and Muir, 2005) the long-run relation between public debt and 
the net external position (and hence between the current account and the fiscal balance) 
is such that a permanent 1 percentage point increase in public debt reduces desired net 
foreign assets by ½ percentage point in the long run. Other open-economy DSGE models 
(see, for example, Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust, 2005) do not incorporate any long-run 
relation between public debt and the external position, and imply a smaller “offset” (0.1 
to 0.2) over the medium term.  
Finally, it is important to stress a few other limitations of the model. First, the model has a 
rich “real” structure and a realistic role for monetary policy, but a very stylized structure of 
international financial flows, with only one internationally-traded bond and hence no room 
for capturing the effects of exchange rate and asset price changes on gross external positions. 
We address this issue later in the Section. Second, for the purpose of interpreting the results 
for Europe, the model aggregation is not ideal in that the euro area is considered together 
with Japan, while the rest of Europe constitutes part of the very heterogeneous rest of the 
world block. The choice of aggregating the euro area and Japan reflects the fact that both 
                                                                                                                                                       
liabilities accumulate, acting as a brake on the size and persistence of current account deficits.  
12 Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005a) discuss alternative parametrizations of this elasticity of substitution.
13 An exception is the study by Engel and Rogers (2006).   14 
regions are experiencing slow growth relative to their historical averages, face similar 
demographic pressures, and have floating exchange rates. Also, as mentioned in Section II, 
the dynamics of the current account balances of Europe and Japan have historically being 
strongly positively correlated. A “de facto” disaggregation is undertaken in the exercise on 
valuation effects that follow.  
C.   Model-Based Adjustment Scenarios 
As mentioned earlier, the U.S. trade deficit—currently 6 percent of GDP—has to eventually 
decline to ensure that U.S. net external liabilities do not grow without bounds. Analogously, 
the large trade surpluses of Asian economies and oil exporters have to shrink to ensure that 
their external assets eventually stabilize as a ratio of GDP. We focus on three possible 
adjustment scenarios (also described in IMF 2005b, 2006).  
•  The first, baseline scenario sees little change in economic policy across regions. 
Monetary policy is anchored by a Taylor rule aimed at stabilizing inflation except—as 
mentioned earlier—in emerging Asia, where the exchange rate is pegged to the U.S. 
dollar. Fiscal policy stabilizes the debt to GDP ratio. There is a gradual increase in U.S. 
private saving, entailing a slow reduction in the U.S. current account deficit.  
•  The second, “disruptive” scenario features instead a sharp decline in other countries’ 
willingness to hold U.S. assets and an abandonment of emerging Asia’s peg to the dollar, 
with the resulting abrupt exchange rate realignments temporarily reducing global 
competition pressures (higher price and wage markups). Monetary policy responds to 
these inflationary pressures, and the combined effect of shocks and policy responses 
causes a generalized decline in output relative to trend in all regions of the world. 
•  Finally, the third scenario is characterized by the implementation of a set of policies 
designed to reduce imbalances and stave off the risks of a disorderly adjustment. In 
emerging Asia, there is a shift towards a flexible exchange rate regime, with monetary 
policy following a Taylor rule similar to the one in other region. The ensuing decline in 
the accumulation of reserves is assumed to reflect a decline in the desired stock of long-
run net foreign assets, and hence entails an increase in private consumption. Finally, 
there is a modest increase in productivity assumed to be driven by financial sector 
reform. In the United States, there is a reduction in the U.S. budget deficit from 4 
percent of GDP in the baseline to broad balance by 2011.
14 In the euro area and Japan, 
structural reforms are assumed to raise productivity and growth by lowering mark-ups in 
both labor and product markets, thereby reducing precautionary savings. Finally, a boost 
to consumption and investment is assumed to take place in oil exporters, as their 
                                                 
14 The budget deficit is assumed to subsequently widen to some extent, driven by demographic trends.  15 
infrastructure is upgraded and consumption reflects the improvement in the terms of 
trade.  
Figure 6 summarizes the main features of the three scenarios, focusing on the United States, 
emerging Asia, and the Japan/euro area block. It displays the behavior of output growth, the 
current account, net foreign assets, and the real effective exchange rate, defined as the ratio 
of trading partners’ price levels to the domestic price level (so that an increase implies a real 
depreciation).  
Baseline scenario 
In this scenario (represented by the blue line in Figure 6), the negative shock to U.S. private 
savings unwinds slowly, leading to a gradual reduction in the U.S. trade and current account 
deficits. The slow current account adjustment implies a substantial accumulation of external 
liabilities by the United States, which reach 50 percent of GDP by 2015 and over 80 percent 
in the very long run, matched by the accumulation of external assets elsewhere, particularly 
in emerging Asia and in the euro area-Japan bloc. The slow trade balance adjustment is 
accompanied by a gradual depreciation of the dollar vis-à-vis all trading partners, of over 15 
percent in real effective terms over the long run. In emerging Asia, because of the exchange 




This scenario, depicted by the red line in Figure 6, is characterized by a sharp reversal of the 
portfolio preference for U.S. assets, an abandonment of emerging Asia’s peg to the dollar 
that results in an abrupt exchange rate realignment, and reduced global competitive pressures. 
The latter effect, akin to the worldwide adoption of protectionist measures, is proxied in the 
model by an increase in margins (a decline in product market competition) in all regions of 
the world.
16 As a result of these shocks, the dollar falls very sharply vis-à-vis all currencies, 
but particularly so vis-à-vis the currencies in emerging Asia.
17 The dollar depreciation is 
                                                 
15 The model has no room for effective sterilized exchange rate intervention, which would delay real exchange 
rate adjustment. Consequently, this adjustment in emerging Asia is relatively rapid, despite the exchange rate 
peg. See also Faruqee et al (2006) on the macroeconomic impact of a protectionist response to global 
imbalances. 
16  For example, the abandonment of the dollar peg by emerging Asia may imply the disappearance of a factor 
which has increased competition in the traded goods’ sector and thus helped keep inflation low.   
17 Using a portfolio balance model, Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005) highlight that if China abandons a dollar 
peg, the yen and the euro would appreciate vis-à-vis the dollar, because the market loses an investor with 
‘extreme’ dollar preference. Of course, the bilateral euro appreciation need not imply a real effective 
appreciation. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005) consider a disruptive scenario in which Asia maintains its dollar peg, 
which implies a much larger bilateral appreciation of the euro against the dollar.  16 
driven by the decline in demand for U.S. assets, and the adjustment of the U.S. current 
account is very abrupt. Correspondingly, the current accounts in other regions of the world 
worsen. De facto, the adjustment process is “collapsed” in a very short period, and hence 
more disruptive. In terms of output performance, the disruptive effects are enhanced by 
reduced competition, which generates inflationary pressures, causing an increase in interest 
rates and a generalized decline in activity in all regions.  
“Policies” scenario 
In addition to the gradual “baseline” unwinding of imbalances generated by rising U.S. 
private saving, this scenario envisages the implementation of a series of policy measures 
which broadly reflect those outlined in several G-7 and IMFC Communiqués. These policies 
include: (i) a substantial reduction in the U.S. budget deficit, from 4 percent of GDP (the 
baseline level) to broad balance excluding social security by early in the next decade; (ii) 
increased exchange rate flexibility and measures raising private consumption in emerging 
Asia, (iii) growth-enhancing structural reforms in the euro area and Japan, and (iv) a boost to 
investment in oil exporters.
18  
In this scenario, depicted by the green line in Figure 6, the U.S. current account adjusts more 
rapidly, since all policy actions go in the direction of reducing U.S. net external borrowing. 
The corresponding exchange rate adjustment is more rapid in emerging Asia, where the 
abandonment of the peg implies a quicker real appreciation, occurring through a shift in the 
nominal exchange rate rather than through inflation as in the baseline. While world growth 
declines in the short run, reflecting the initially contractionary effects of fiscal adjustment in 
the United States, it is higher over the medium term, thanks to higher growth in Japan and the 
euro area and the lower interest rates associated with a declining U.S. public debt. 
Clearly, not all policies have the same impact on the U.S. current account deficit. The most 
significant impact comes from U.S. fiscal policy—a 1 percent of GDP reduction in the 
budget deficit improves the current account balance by ½ percent of GDP over the medium 
term, and hence accounts for almost half of the total U.S. current account adjustment relative 
to the baseline. The quantitative impact of structural reforms in Japan and the euro area on 
the U.S. current account is instead relatively modest, but plays an important role in sustaining 
world growth as U.S. domestic demand declines.  
                                                 
18  Increased exchange rate flexibility in Asia is captured by assuming that the region shifts to a monetary policy 
rule similar to the one in other parts of the world, while the increase in private consumption is generated by an 
increase in consumers’ “impatience.” In addition, the shift in the exchange rate regime is associated with a 
decline in desired net foreign assets, which can be interpreted as resulting from a decline in the accumulation of 
reserves. Structural reforms in the euro area and Japan are assumed to lead to an increase in goods’ and labor 
market competition, with the decline in mark-ups eliminating about two thirds of the gap with U.S. levels over a 
ten-year period. Also, increased productivity growth is assumed to be reflected in lower precautionary savings. 
Finally, increased domestic demand in oil exporters is generated by an investment shock (triggered by higher 
productivity) as well as higher consumption.  17 
Implications for the euro area 
The euro area represents over two thirds of the “Japan-euro area” bloc. In terms of the small 
list of key variables shown in Figure 6, there are substantial differences between the Japan 
and the euro area in regard to current account balances (where Japan has a hefty surplus, 
while the euro area is in broad balance), net foreign assets (that in Japan are around 40 
percent of GDP, while the euro area is a net external debtor), and recent trends in real 
effective exchange rates (where the euro has appreciated by around 20 percent in real 
effective terms between February 2002 and February 2007, while the yen has depreciated by 
around 17 percent during the same period). 
Together, these trends would suggest that, in the scenarios depicted in Figure 6, current 
account adjustment and real effective exchange rate appreciation would be more substantial 
in Japan than in the euro area. Assumptions along those lines underpin our next exercise, 
which attempts to quantify the valuation effects on the external position that would be 
implied by the three scenarios just described.  
D.   Valuation Changes 
While the scenarios presented in the previous section provide a useful perspective on some 
possible features of global external adjustment, they do not include the impact of currency 
realignments on net external positions. The main reason why the model cannot properly 
capture valuation effects is that it only allows for one internationally-traded bond and hence 
only net exposures between countries—in other words, a debtor country has only external 
liabilities and no external assets, while a creditor country has only external assets and no 
external liabilities. This limits the impact of exchange rate changes on the value of a 
country’s assets and liabilities. For example, at end-2005 the United States net external 
position (excluding gold) was negative for about $2.7 trillion. However, its net U.S. dollar 
position was around minus $9 trillion, because the United States holds substantial external 
assets denominated in foreign currency.  
We are not the first in considering how valuation effects affect external adjustment in models 
where the U.S. current account deficit shrinks. Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005), Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (2005, 2007), and Cavallo and Tille (2006) have also considered these issues, 
albeit with a simpler underlying macroeconomic structure and a more stylized calibration of 
portfolio structure.  
In order to infer the potential implications of exchange rate adjustment for the value of the 
external holdings in the model, we start from the currency and asset composition of the 
international balance sheet for the main country blocks in 2005. We then consider a set of 
projections for capital inflows and outflows (and their currency composition) for all 
scenarios, such that the net flows are equal to the model’s projected current account balances. 
The projected flows, together with the model-based path for exchange rates, allow us to 
calculate the evolution of gross external assets and liabilities, and more specifically the  18 
impact of valuation changes on the net external position. In undertaking this exercise, we 
separate out projections for the euro area and Japan, both in terms of external current account 
adjustment and in terms of external portfolios. As mentioned earlier, we assume that the real 
exchange rate and current account adjustment is larger in Japan than in the euro area. We 
also consider China separately from the rest of emerging Asia, assuming that real exchange 
rate and current account adjustment in China are broadly of a similar order of magnitude as 
for the region as a whole. 
The exposure of a country to movements in exchange rates clearly depends on the currency 
composition of its international balance sheet. Estimating such currency composition is a 
difficult exercise. This is especially true for currencies such as the dollar and the euro that are 
heavily employed in international financial trade, since even information about the 
geographical distribution of external portfolios is only of limited value when many countries 
issue debt denominated in these currencies. For instance, the net dollar position of the euro 
area is the sum of dollar assets located in the U.S. (which is not equal to the sum of total euro 
area assets in the U.S., since the U.S. also issues euro-denominated liabilities), plus dollar 
assets located elsewhere, minus the dollar liabilities issued by euro area residents to non-
residents.  
Appendix 2 discusses how we estimated the currency composition of the external portfolio 
for the United States, the euro area, Japan, and China. The data are summarized in Table 1. It 
shows that all countries are short in their domestic currencies and that the euro area, Japan 
and China are each long in dollars (although the figures for China are subject to significant 
uncertainty, given the lack of data on the currency composition of its portfolio). However, 
Japan and China are much larger “dollar creditors” than the euro area relative to their GDP 
levels. This reflects their aggregate net creditor status and a portfolio composition that is 
more heavily weighted towards the dollar than is the case for the euro area. Finally, as 
already highlighted by Tille (2005), the U.S. net dollar liability position is very substantial.  
An important caveat to our analysis is the lack of systematic data on cross-border hedging. 
Note that hedging vis-à-vis other domestic residents would only shift the risk within an 
economy, but would not affect its overall exposure to the rest of the world. Hau and Rey 
(2006) indicate that the level of hedging for portfolio equity positions is limited, and the BIS 
foreign exchange survey suggests that most hedging is undertaken with domestic 
counterparties. In addition, hedging long-term exposures is very costly. Nevertheless, to the 
extent that at least some of the net positions we estimate are indeed hedged, our estimation 
would only provide an upper bound on the valuation effects of cross-currency fluctuations.
19
                                                 
19 Campbell et al (2006) find that the dollar is almost uncorrelated with the U.S. equity market and negatively 
correlated with the world equity market, suggesting that international investors may wish to hold long dollar 
positions as a risk-minimization strategy.  19 
Projections of capital flows and of their currency composition are necessary to keep track of 
valuation changes in the years following the initial shock. Recent years have seen a major 
increase in cross-border flows, so that external assets and liabilities have been increasing 
sharply in relation to GDP. We assume that this trend will continue in the future, albeit at a 
slower pace. Inflows and outflows of specific types—direct investment, portfolio equity, 
portfolio debt, other investment flows, and reserves—are assumed in most cases to remain 
constant as a share of GDP, broadly reflecting recent trends (Appendix Table 1). In order to 
ensure that net capital flows equal the model’s path for the current account, we assume that 
for each country/block there is one residual category of flows that acts as “adjustor”—foreign 
exchange reserves for emerging Asia, portfolio debt assets for the euro area and Japan, and 
portfolio debt liabilities for the United States.  
With regard to the currency composition of countries’ external portfolios, we make a stark 
simplifying assumption—namely, that the share of each asset and liability category 
denominated in dollars and other currencies remains constant over time. This implies that 
countries fully offset the impact of valuation changes on the currency composition of their 
portfolio: as the dollar depreciates, for example, the currency composition of flows ensures 
that the dollar share of each asset and liability category remains constant. This assumption 
turns out to be less restrictive than it appears at first sight: in the two scenarios involving 
“large” currency movements in the short run, the initial currency exposure is key in 
determining the valuation effects, and that exposure is predetermined. 
Valuation changes in the model are captured as follows. For dollar-denominated assets and 
liabilities, their domestic-currency value is adjusted to reflect changes in the exchange rate 
between the dollar and the domestic currency. In addition, for portfolio equity assets in the 
United States we assume that their capital value increases in line with the U.S. GDP growth 
rate. For the remaining foreign-currency assets, we make the following assumptions: 
•  For foreign direct investment and portfolio equity assets by non-U.S. countries outside 
the U.S., we assume that their dollar value increases in proportion to the effective 
depreciation of the U.S. dollar;  
•  For portfolio equity assets (and liabilities) we also assume capital gains in proportion to 
output growth in the rest of the world (for assets), and domestic output growth (for 
liabilities). We do not make a corresponding valuation adjustment for FDI flows in light 
of the fact that for FDI reinvested earnings are counted investment income (and 
correspondingly as new FDI) while for portfolio equity holdings retained company 
profits are reflected in the firm valuation, but not in investment income.  
Table 5 shows the main results in terms of capital gains and losses for the various scenarios, 
showing both capital gains and losses induced by changes in real exchange rates as well as 
overall capital gains and losses (including those arising from the assumed capital gains on 
portfolio equity holdings). Capital gains as of 2008 and 2015 are calculated as the present  20 
value of the difference between the net foreign asset position and the cumulative value of the 
current account at that date (measured in U.S. dollars), as a ratio of 2005 GDP. The applied 
discount rate is 6 percent, about 1 percent higher than the current interest rate on long-term 
U.S. bonds. 
•  Clearly, the United States stands to gain from valuation effects in all scenarios. While 
exchange-rate related valuation gains are larger in the baseline, in light of the larger 
stock of U.S. dollar liabilities, higher growth in the policies scenario drives higher 
growth-induced capital gains on U.S. equity holdings overseas, and hence larger overall 
gains in that scenario.  
•  For all remaining country groups, the disruptive scenario generates the largest capital 
losses. These are particularly high in China and Japan, because of the scale of exchange 
rate appreciation as well as of net dollar exposure—in the euro area, capital losses are 
only about a third as high as in Asia. The assumption that capital gains made by 
foreigners on portfolio equity liabilities are related to the country’s growth rate magnify 
China’s total net capital losses on the external position, as can be seen by comparing 
total with exchange-rate-induced capital losses.
20 
•  With regard to the euro area, exchange-rate-induced capital losses are significant but 
much smaller than for China and Japan. Faster growth of the euro area economy in the 
“policies” scenario imply larger capital gains for non-residents on euro area’s equity 
assets, and therefore total net capital losses on the external position are larger in the 
policies scenario than in the baseline, although the exchange-rate-related losses are 
somewhat smaller.  
How would these gains and losses affect the external adjustment path depicted in Figure 6? 
For given long-run values of net external assets and liabilities across regions, valuation gains 
and losses would allow regions experiencing capital gains to sustain—other things being 
equal—higher consumption equivalent to the annuity value of such gains, and 
correspondingly require higher surpluses (and hence lower consumption) to achieve desired 
long-run asset holdings in regions experiencing capital losses. However, the size of long-run 
real exchange rate adjustment would be unchanged relative to the situation without valuation 
effects.
21 Of course, looking forward, it would be desirable to fully embed portfolio choices 
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20 This result is crucially driven by the assumption concerning capital gains on portfolio equity as well as by the 
additional assumption that China accumulates portfolio equity liabilities (worth over 10 percent of GDP by 
2015, compared to around 3 percent now).  
21 In contrast, in the exercise undertaken in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005), valuation effects reduce the need for 
exchange rate adjustment. This occurs because the authors focus on the exchange rate adjustment needed to 
reduce the U.S. current account deficit by a given percentage of GDP. A dollar depreciation reduces the stock of 
U.S. net external liabilities, and therefore its debt service burden relative to GDP. This implies that the trade  21 
in a general equilibrium model. While this line of research is currently receiving much 
attention (see, for example, Devereux and Sutherland, 2007; Engel and Matsumoto, 2006; 
Ghironi, Lee, and Rebucci, 2007), it is still in its early days.  
A final important point concerns the possibility that exchange rate adjustment will not take 
place as the model scenarios suggest. In particular, in all model scenarios, the real effective 
appreciation in emerging Asia—occurring through inflation in the baseline, and nominal 
appreciation in the other scenarios—is relatively rapid. 
22 Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005b) 
present a scenario where Asian countries maintain a dollar peg even as the U.S. current 
account shrinks and the dollar weakens. In the three-region world they consider the third 
region—Europe—bears the brunt of the adjustment, with a sharp appreciation of the euro as 
the U.S. deficit shrinks and Asia’s surplus increases.  
IV.   HETEROGENEITY 
An additional factor in considering the European impact of a global correction is the 
heterogeneity across Europe in terms of initial conditions and exposure to a correction in the 
US external imbalance. We consider three dimensions of heterogeneity: first, differences in 
trade patterns; second, different financial exposures to movements in the dollar and US asset 
prices; and, third, differences in external positions.  
A.   The Trade Channel 
Table 3a shows that intra-European trade constitutes the lion’s share of total international 
transactions for European countries. The level of direct trade with the United States and East 
Asia is relatively low in most cases, the main exception being the high level of trade between 
Ireland and the United States. In addition, the data show that the United States and East Asia 
are broadly similar in importance as trading partners for most European countries (although, 
of course, the sectoral composition of trade is likely to be very different across these two 
regions.). Accordingly, the direct impact of a slowdown (or a switch in expenditures away 
from imports towards domestically-produced goods) in the United States on individual 
European countries through the trade channel is limited in magnitude.
 Moreover, a 
redistribution in spending from the United States to East Asia (as in benign adjustment 
scenarios) would have a roughly neutral aggregate impact, with rising trade with East Asia 
compensating for a decline in trade with the United States.  
However, the scale of direct trade is an incomplete measure, since European firms may 
compete with American firms for market share in common third markets. For this reason, it 
                                                                                                                                                       
balance adjustment necessary to achieve the needed reduction in the current account deficit is smaller, and 
hence the needed dollar depreciation is smaller. 
22 Technically, this occurs in the baseline because the model does not have scope for sterilized intervention.  22 
is also informative to take into account such third-country effects in quantifying the 
importance of the trade channel. Accordingly, Table 3b shows the weight of the United 
States in the multilateral real exchange rates for various European countries. The trade 
weights used are so-called double export weights, in order to capture not only competition in 
the domestic markets of the various competitors but also competition in export markets 
elsewhere. The bilateral exchange rates between the currency of a given country and the 
currencies of its competitor countries are weighted according to the competitors' share in the 
total supply of competing goods (including the supply by domestic producers) in each market 
separately and the relative share of each market in the total exports of the given country. 
The results in Table 3b largely back up the data on trade volumes in Table 3a: while the 
United States has a high trade weight for Ireland and the United Kingdom, its weight is 
typically less than 10 percent for most European countries. Similarly, it is again the case that 
East Asia is comparable in importance to the United States in relation to trade weights. 
Overall, the message from Tables 3a-3b is that the trade channel is only of limited 
importance for most European countries—however, it poses a particular vulnerability for 
Ireland and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom. Moreover, scenarios in which 
contraction and/or depreciation in the United States is offset by expansion and/or 
appreciation in Asia represents a broadly-neutral aggregate trade environment for most 
European countries. 
B.   The Valuation Channel 
In Figure 6, we showed that European countries now hold much higher levels of cross-border 
assets and liabilities than was the case 10 or 20 years ago. As is demonstrated in the 
accounting framework in Appendix 1, this means that shifts in the rates of return earned on 
foreign assets and paid out on foreign liabilities are an increasingly important source of 
movements in net foreign asset positions and generate cross-border wealth effects. In this 
subsection, we examine the impact on European wealth of a decline in U.S. asset markets and 
a depreciation in the dollar against European currencies. 
Table 7 shows the estimated net dollar positions for individual European economies in the 
various investment categories. Our method of calculating these positions largely follows the 
procedures employed in section III to measure the net dollar positions of the aggregate euro 
area, the United States, Japan, and China. In particular, the net dollar position in the FDI 
category is the sum of a country’s FDI stock in the United States plus 50 percent of its FDI 
stock in offshore financial centers. Similarly, for most countries, the net dollar position in the 
portfolio equity category is the sum of a country’s portfolio equity stock in the US plus 50 
percent of its portfolio equity stock in offshore financial centers. However, for five members 
of the euro area—Austria, Greece, France, Italy, and Portugal—we are able to use their 
directly reported dollar positions in the portfolio asset category. In order to calculate net 
dollar exposures in the portfolio debt category for the other countries, we follow the pattern  23 
we observed for the aggregate euro area in the previous section by assuming that total 
portfolio dollar assets are 3.5 times as large as direct portfolio debt assets in the United States 
and that total portfolio dollar liabilities are 1.67 times as large as portfolio debt liabilities vis-
à-vis the United States.  
We also report the estimated net dollar position of the banking sectors in each European 
country. For most countries, we obtained these data from the websites of national central 
banks; otherwise, we calculated the net dollar position of the banking sector as the sum of net 
foreign-currency claims on the United States plus 75 percent of net foreign-currency claims 
on other countries.
 23
Finally, we add as a memo item the level of FDI liabilities vis-à-vis the United States. This is 
included, since one transmission mechanism that is periodically discussed is the impact of 
exchange rate movements on direct investment decisions, with dollar depreciation assumed 
to have an adverse impact on the level of American direct investment into Europe.  
An important message from Table 7 is that the level of dollar exposure is relatively small for 
most European countries. Among the members of the euro area, three groups can be 
distinguished, with the group of Austria, Finland, Greece, Italy, and Portugal having a low 
level of dollar exposure, a second group comprising Belgium, France, and Germany having 
an intermediate level of exposure, while the financial centers of Ireland, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands have a much higher level of exposure.
24 We also highlight that the group of euro 
‘outs’ (Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom) have a higher average level of dollar 
exposure, as do Norway and especially Switzerland. In regard to the banking sector, net 
dollar positions are negative for most European countries (the U.K. banking sector has an 
especially large short dollar position—see Elliott and Min, 2004), with the main exceptions 
being the long net dollar positions in Germany, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. Finally, 
turning to FDI liabilities vis-à-vis the United States, Ireland has by far the largest exposure—
U.S. FDI in Ireland amounts to 69 percent of Ireland’s GDP. Among the other countries, U.S. 
                                                 
23 We assume that the ‘foreign currency’ assets and liabilities of European banks in the U.S. are denominated in 
dollars. The 75 percent ratio for foreign currency assets and liabilities vis-à-vis other countries is based on 
aggregate BIS data on the currency composition of foreign-currency assets and liabilities of its reporting banks. 
While the assets and liabilities of banks primarily take the form of loans and deposits (part of the ‘other’ 
category in the international investment position), the banking sector is also a holder of securities, so there is 
some overlap with the portfolio debt and equity categories for those countries that do not provide a breakdown 
between loans/deposits and other instruments. 
24 We do not report the portfolio equity and debt positions for Ireland and Luxembourg, since these categories 
are heavily influenced by the presence of large mutual fund sectors that mostly cater to off-shore investors. 
Since shares in mutual funds are classified as portfolio equity liabilities, regardless of the investment profile of 
the mutual fund, these countries have large negative net equity positions and large positive net debt positions.  24 
FDI is substantial only for the euro ‘outs’ and the financial centers of Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands.
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Having established the net dollar positions of individual European economies, we consider in 
Table 8 the impact of an unanticipated decline in the U.S. dollar, in line with the ‘disruptive’ 
scenario laid out in Section III. Under this scenario, the dollar depreciates by about 20 
percent against the euro and this depreciation persists at least out to 2015. Clearly, the 
information in Table 7 could be used to examine alternative shocks to the dollar and to US 
asset prices. For instance, Warnock (2006) considers the impact of a simultaneous 10 percent 
decline in the dollar and 10 percent fall in U.S. equity and bond markets on a wide range of 
counterpart countries, where he primarily relies on gross dollar exposures. Once again, the 
same caveat about the lack of information on cross-border hedging applies here.  
The results in Table 8 show that all European countries experience a capital loss in event of 
dollar depreciation. For most countries, the loss on FDI, portfolio equity, and bond positions 
is about 1.5-3 percent of GDP, which is partially offset by a capital gain from the short dollar 
position in the banking sector. While the overall effect is the same order of magnitude as 
current account imbalances for these countries, the wealth effect from such a loss is minor. 
However, there is a group of countries that register noticeably higher capital losses: these 
include the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom and Switzerland, 
even if capital gains in the banking sector provide a partial offset for the United Kingdom 
and Sweden.
26  
The numbers in Table 8 relate only to movements in the dollar-euro exchange rate. Under a 
disruptive adjustment scenario, slower economic growth and an increase in interest rates 
would have a negative impact on world asset prices—and particularly U.S. asset prices, since 
the shock involves a shift in portfolio preferences away from U.S. assets.
27 This would 
amplify the capital losses suffered by countries with large investment positions in the United 
States. While asset price changes would have an additional impact on net external positions, 
they would have a more pronounced effect on domestic financial wealth, in light of the still 
strong home bias in asset holdings. From this perspective, the effects on economic activity 
                                                 
25 The level of U.S. FDI in Luxembourg and the Netherlands is over-stated due to the role of these countries as a 
home for holding companies that are employed by U.S. parents to conduct direct investment in other 
destinations. The table does not show the level of U.S. FDI in Central and Eastern Europe—but this stock is 
only a small fraction of the GDP levels of these countries.  
26 However, the capital gains to the banking sector in the United Kingdom (and other international financial 
centers) will largely accrue to the foreign-owned banks that are most heavily involved in international banking 
transactions – that is, it may be associated with an increase in the value of the FDI liabilities of the United 
Kingdom and/or a larger profit outflow to the parent entities. See also Elliot and Min (2004).   
27 In terms of historical co-movements between asset prices and exchange rates, it is noteworthy that Campbell 
et al (2006) find little correlation between the dollar-euro exchange rate and the US stock market.  25 
would likely be strongest in the countries suffering the largest decline in asset prices. Indeed, 
the disruptive scenario described in Section III features a sharper decline in activity in the 
United States than elsewhere. 
C.   Net External Positions 
Figures 7 and 8 show that the broad external balance of the European economy obscures 
significant differences in external positions across individual European countries. These 
differences are highlighted in Table 9, which shows the distribution of current account 
balances and net foreign asset positions, plus the decomposition of the latter between net 
equity and net debt. There is a bi-modal distribution of current account balances, with one 
group running sizeable surpluses (Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, and Switzerland) and another group running deficits of similar magnitude to the US 
deficit (Greece, Portugal, Spain and the Central and Eastern European countries). This 
distribution is broadly replicated for net foreign asset positions (the correlation is 0.85), 
highlighting the persistence of these imbalances. 
In terms of exposures, these differences in external positions matter for several reasons. First, 
to the extent that the correction of global imbalances involves an increase in global interest 
rates (for instance due an increase in domestic investment in Asia and the oil producers, as in 
the ‘policies’ scenario in section III), this will have a positive impact on the financial terms 
of trade of countries with a positive net debt position and a corresponding negative impact on 
countries with a negative net debt position. Table 9 shows that there are considerable 
differences between aggregate net positions and net debt positions. In particular, the external 
liabilities of some countries primarily take the form of equity liabilities—the CEEC group 
provides a good illustration, with FDI the predominant form of liabilities for these countries 
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007a).
28 Conversely, most of the advanced European countries 
(whether aggregate creditors or debtors) have negative net debt positions—with the typical 
creditor nation in effect employing leverage to build positive a net external equity position. 
For these countries, an increase in world interest rates raises the cost of leveraging. Aside 
from the financial centers of Ireland and Luxembourg, the only European countries that have 
positive net debt positions and would thereby enjoy a positive terms of trade effect from an 
increase in world interest rates are Belgium, Norway, and Switzerland. 
A second possibility—related to the ‘disruptive’ scenario in section III—is that international 
investors will show increased risk aversion in relation to the currencies of those countries 
running significant current account deficits. In this case, it is important to differentiate 
between those countries that are members of the euro area (where the broad external balance 
of the aggregate euro area suggests that the euro would not be weakened under this scenario) 
and those outside the euro area (that is, the CEEC group). In particular, an increase in 
                                                 
28 However, some CEEC countries do have significant net external foreign-currency debt (e.g. Hungary).  26 
international risk aversion may reduce capital flows to these countries, with the countries 
most at risk being those with significant net external debt denominated in foreign currency.
29
Third, a disruptive adjustment scenario would have a negative impact on global equity 
values, through its negative impact on global economic growth.
30 As discussed earlier, the 
negative wealth effect of a decline in domestic equity values would be quantitatively the 
most important. In addition, the advanced European economies with large net external equity 
positions would suffer a negative valuation effect, even for those countries with a limited net 
dollar exposure.  
D.   Policy Discussion 
Although it is important not to over-state the scale of heterogeneous exposures across 
Europe, this section has indicated that differences in trade patterns, financial exposures, and 
net external positions mean that a disruptive adjustment in global imbalances would 
constitute an asymmetric shock. Adjustment to this shock may in principle require non-trivial 
bilateral real exchange rate movements between European countries.
31 Real exchange rate 
adjustment between creditor and debtor members of the euro area would need to be 
accomplished through differential inflation rates—this would plausibly be a slow process in 
light of the low inflation rate in creditor countries, and may therefore be associated with more 
pronounced cyclical slowdowns in debtor countries, especially so if structural rigidities 
hinder the intersectoral reallocation of resources (see Blanchard, 2006). Outside the euro 
area, the other advanced European economies all have strong domestic anchors for monetary 
policy and can achieve bilateral adjustment vis-à-vis the euro area through nominal exchange 
rate movements.  
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe that are running large current account deficits and 
do not have similarly robust domestic monetary anchors would instead face a tension 
between external adjustment and a desire to maintain a stable nominal exchange rate against 
the euro, as a precursor to eventual euro adoption. A key policy issue in these countries is 
ensuring that the economies are flexible enough to cope with potentially large shift in 
international relative prices and external demand. 
                                                 
29  See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a) for a discussion of capital flows to CEE countries.  
30 In addition to the direct valuation effects from holding U.S. assets, European wealth may be affected 
indirectly via the transmission of financial shocks in the U.S. to asset prices in Europe and other regions. At one 
level, European asset prices may be negatively affected through the decline in wealth of investors taking losses 
in the US. Coeurdacier (2005) provides a recent theoretical model of this mechanism. 
31 The vulnerability of high current account deficit countries to a decline in global liquidity is well exemplified 
by the sharp decline in the Icelandic krona during the first half of 2006.   27 
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has attempted to assess the potential impact on Europe of an unwinding of global 
imbalances. We have emphasized that the growth in trade and financial linkages between 
Europe and the rest of the world means that the spillover impact on Europe of a contraction 
in the U.S. deficit and Asian surpluses is now larger than twenty years ago. That said, we 
have also shown that the scale of global integration in trade and finance remains limited, and 
the exposure of Europe to external shocks should not be overstated.  
In terms of overall adjustment, the model simulations show possible paths for current 
accounts, real exchange rates, and growth under alternative adjustment scenarios. In 
particular, they highlight how a reduction in the U.S. trade deficit is likely to be associated 
with substantial real dollar depreciation, but—if exchange rates in Asia are allowed to 
adjust—need not imply large real exchange rate changes for the euro area.  
The scenarios also suggest that “structural reforms” in the euro area—broadly interpreted to 
encompass measures that increase competition in goods and labor markets and stimulate 
productivity growth—can help the adjustment process from a global perspective by modestly 
helping U.S. current account adjustment, but especially by helping sustain world growth. Of 
course, the most important dimension of these policies is their domestic impact on European 
economic performance. However, with increasing levels of global economic integration, 
even the determination of domestically-orientated policies must take into account 
international factors. Indeed, a major motivation for structural reforms is to boost the 
flexibility of European economies so as to improve their capacity to cope with globalization 
and swings in the external environment. 
A particular contribution of our paper has been to quantify the importance of the valuation 
channel in these alternative adjustment scenarios. In particular, we have shown that the 
exposure of Europe to the dollar, while non-negligible, is much smaller than the exposure of 
emerging Asia and Japan. To the extent that a real effective depreciation of the dollar occurs 
primarily vis-à-vis the largest creditor countries and regions—emerging Asia, Japan, and oil 
exporters—the consequences for Europe in general, and the euro area in particular, would not 
be large.  
Clearly, the risks for Europe are much more significant if creditor country currencies, many 
of which closely track the U.S. dollar, fail to adjust, so that at least in the short term a 
weakening of the dollar would imply a substantial real effective appreciation for Europe and 
the euro area. In turn, this could have strong negative repercussions on activity, underscoring 
the importance of policy measures that help sustain output and demand.  
Looking forward, a shift in international portfolio preferences may well be associated with an 
increase in the role of the euro as a reserve currency (see, for example, Chinn and Frankel, 
2007). While we have not addressed this issue in the paper, one could envisage scenarios  28 
where net exports are negatively affected by the appreciation of the euro, but economic 
activity benefits from a decline in required returns on euro area assets.  
Finally, we have probed possible differences across European economies in their 
vulnerability to a shift in global imbalances. While there is substantial variation in the extent 
of trade and financial linkages between individual European countries and the United States 
and Asia, the scale of such linkages is limited even for the most exposed countries (with the 
possible exception of Ireland). If this shift were to be accompanied by a less benign 
international financial environment, characterized by higher spreads on debtor countries and 
less bountiful capital flows, some countries in Central and Eastern Europe may be forced to 
undergo a sharp adjustment in their external accounts.  29 
Appendix 1. Decomposition of Changes in Net Foreign Assets 
In earlier work, we have developed an accounting framework that is helpful in thinking about 
the dynamics of external positions (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2005a, 2005b). We provide a 
brief presentation of this framework in this appendix. 
The change in the net foreign asset position B can be written as follows: 
  1 tt t t B B CA KG − t − =++ Ε  (1) 
where  t B  is the net foreign asset position,   is the current account balance,   is the 
capital gain or loss on net foreign assets (equal to the change in stocks minus the underlying 
flows) and the term   includes factors such as capital account transfers (the so-called 
capital account balance) and errors and omissions that drive a wedge between a country’s 
current account and net inflows of capital. In turn, the current account   equals the sum of 
the balance on goods, services, and current transfers 
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t i  are the nominal yields on these assets and liabilities.
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Indicating ratios to GDP with lower-case letters, we can express (1) as follows: 
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where   is the growth rate of real GDP,  t g t π  is the inflation rate, and the term ε  includes the 
ratio of capital transfers and errors and omissions to GDP. The second and third term on the 
right-hand-side of equation (2) captures the effect of nominal returns on external assets and 
liabilities on the evolution of the external position. To see this more clearly, define  ()
A L
tt kg kg  
as the ratio of the capital gain on external assets (liabilities), measured in domestic currency, 
to the outstanding stock of external assets (liabilities) at the beginning of the period, so 
that . Then the real rate of return on foreign assets, measured in 
domestic currency, will equal 
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, and an analogous definition will hold for 
                                                 
32 We incorporate international labor income in the term BGST.   30 
the rate of return on foreign liabilities 
L
t r . Using these definitions, we can re-write (2) as 
follows:
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This framework delivers several important insights. First, the trade balance is only one factor 
in determining the aggregate evolution of the net foreign asset position: the “intrinsic 
dynamics” of net foreign assets depend on the difference between the rate of return on 
liabilities and the growth rate, captured by the second term on the RHS of (3), which is 
familiar from the standard debt accumulation equation. The importance of this effect depends 
on a country’s net foreign asset position—an increase in the rate of return improves the net 
foreign asset position of a creditor but is adverse for a debtor. 
Second, when rates of return on external assets and liabilities differ, the gross scale of 
external assets and liabilities matters in addition to the net position, as shown by the last term 
on the RHS of equation (3). Differences in rates of return between external assets and 
liabilities can arise for various reasons:
34  
•  In larger advanced economies, assets tend to be denominated in foreign currency and 
liabilities mostly in domestic currency. Consequently, an unexpected exchange rate 
depreciation (not reflected in ex-ante interest differentials) will increase the domestic-
currency rate of return on external assets and hence improve the net foreign asset 
position. More generally, differences in the portfolio composition of external assets and 
liabilities (for example, differences in the debt-equity mix) can imply differences in rates 
of return.  
•  In contrast, for emerging markets that are net debtors and whose external liabilities are 
primarily denominated in foreign currency, a real exchange rate depreciation raises the 
domestic-currency burden of foreign liabilities. In recent years, however, a trend towards 
a larger share of external liabilities denominated in domestic currency is at play in 
emerging markets as well, driven in particular by the increased importance of foreign 
FDI and portfolio equity investment.  
•  Differential changes in asset prices (for example, in stock prices) across countries will 
tend to drive a wedge between returns on external assets and liabilities. 
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33 The same equation can be written using real rates of return in dollars, rather than domestic currency, using the 
equivalence  where   is the rate of real domestic-currency appreciation vis-à-vis the 
US dollar.  
$ 1( 1 ) ( 1 tt rr += + + t s
34 See also the extended discussion in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005a).  31 
Appendix 2. Estimating the Currency Composition of Net Foreign Assets 
This Appendix summarizes the methodology used to estimate the currency composition of 
net foreign assets for the euro area, as well as for China, Japan, and the United States. 
A.   The Euro Area 
We rely on a variety of sources, described more in detail below, and we focus in particular on 
holdings denominated in U.S. dollars and in euros.  
External assets 
For foreign direct investment abroad and portfolio equity investment assets, we assume that 
investment in each country is denominated in the currency of that country. In particular, all 
euro area holdings in the United States and half of FDI in offshore centers are assumed to be 
denominated in dollars. Data on the geographical breakdown of the euro area’s International 
Investment Position at end-2004 comes from the August 2006 ECB Bulletin. The share of 
investment in dollars is assumed to be unchanged in 2005. 
For portfolio debt assets, ECB (2005) reports the currency breakdown between euro and 
other currencies at end-2004. To estimate the weight of the dollar in other currencies, we use 
statistics on the currency composition of portfolio debt holdings by euro area Monetary and 
Financial Institutions (MFIs), reported by the ECB, and assume that the dollar share in non-
euro currencies is the same for non-MFI portfolio debt holdings. In light of the 6 percentage 
point decline in the share of euro-denominated portfolio debt holdings by MFIs between end-
2004 and end-2005, we assume a 5 percent decline in the share of total euro-denominated 
holdings in 2005 relative to 2004. 
For other investment assets, we assume that all euro area investment in the United States and 
half of the investment in offshore centers is denominated in dollars, with the remainder 
assumed to be denominated in euros. We again rely on the geographical breakdown of the 
euro area International Investment Position at end-2004 from the August 2006 ECB Bulletin. 
For foreign exchange reserves, we assume a 90 percent weight for the U.S. dollar.  
External liabilities  
For foreign direct investment and portfolio equity investment in the euro area, we assume that 
all liabilities are denominated in euros.  
For portfolio debt liabilities, we use the currency breakdown between euro and other 
currencies at end-2004 reported in ECB (2005). We assume that the dollar share in non-euro 
debt liabilities is 60 percent, in line with BIS data on the currency composition of 
international banking liabilities in the euro area.   32 
For other investment liabilities, we assume that the share denominated in dollars is 25 
percent, with the remainder denominated in euros. This assumption ensures that the net dollar 
position in the “other investment” category is broadly balanced. 
B.   China 
We have virtually no direct information on the currency composition of China’s external 
position, and hence our assumptions are subject to significant uncertainty.  
External assets 
For foreign direct investment abroad and portfolio equity investment assets, we assume for 
simplicity that Chinese holdings in the United States are zero. The United States currently 
reports 2005 FDI holdings by China at historical cost of around US$ ½ billion. 
For portfolio debt assets and other investment assets, we assume that all Chinese overseas 
holdings are denominated in U.S. dollars. 
For foreign exchange reserves, we assume a 75 percent weight for the U.S. dollar and a 25 
percent weight for the euro.  
External liabilities  
For foreign direct investment and portfolio equity investment in China, we assume that all 
liabilities are denominated in renmimbi.  
For portfolio debt and other investment, we assume that all liabilities are denominated in 
U.S. dollars.  
C.   Japan 
We rely primarily on data from the Bank of Japan.  
External assets 
For foreign direct investment abroad and portfolio equity investment assets, we assume 
investment in each country is denominated in the currency of that country. In particular, all 
Japanese investment in the United States and half of Japan’s FDI in offshore centers is 
assumed to be denominated in dollars. Data on the geographical breakdown of Japan’s 
portfolio equity and FDI assets comes from the CPIS and the Bank of Japan, respectively. 
For portfolio debt assets, we use Bank of Japan’s data on the currency composition of 
portfolio debt holdings by Japanese residents (available at 
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/stat/boj_stat/bop/pip/pip2005.zip)  
  33 
For other investment, we assume that the net position (assets minus liabilities)—which is 
negative at 3-4 percent of GDP—is denominated in U.S. dollars.  
For foreign exchange reserves, we assume a 75 percent weight for the U.S. dollar and a 25 
percent weight for the euro. 
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External liabilities  
For foreign direct investment and portfolio equity investment in the Japan, we assume that all 
liabilities are denominated in yen.  
For portfolio debt liabilities, we assume that a 90 percent share is denominated in yen and a 
10 percent share in U.S. dollars. Data from the U.S. Treasury Report on U.S. Portfolio 
Holdings of Foreign Securities indicates that 95 percent of U.S. portfolio debt claims in 
Japan are yen-denominated.  
For other investment liabilities, see the discussion of the “other investment” category above.  
D.   United States 
Our primary sources are Nguyen (2006), who reports details on the U.S. International 
Investment Position, and Tille (2005), who describes available sources for determining the 
currency composition of the U.S. external portfolio. We focus in particular on the 
determination of the net dollar position and the net foreign-currency position.  
External assets 
For foreign direct investment abroad, we rely on the geographical data at historical cost 
published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2006), and approximate the market value by 
multiplying historical cost holdings by the ratio of aggregate market value to historical cost 
value. We assume that FDI in each country is denominated in the currency of that country.  
For portfolio equity assets, we rely on the U.S. Treasury report on U.S. Portfolio Holdings of 
Foreign Securities at end-2004 (http://www.treas.gov/tic/shc2004r.pdf), which reports the 
geographical distribution of U.S. portfolio holdings, assuming that portfolio equity holdings 
in each country are denominated in the currency of that country. We update the data to 2005 
by assuming that the individual country shares of total portfolio equity holdings remain 
unchanged.  
For portfolio debt holdings we rely on the same report, which also contains information on 
the currency composition of these holdings (Tables 21 and 22). 
                                                 
35 Truman and Wong (2006) argue that the weight of the dollar is likely to exceed 80 percent.  34 
 
For other investment assets, we use the reported currency breakdown between dollar and 
foreign currencies for bank claims (Nguyen (2006), Table D) and assume that the breakdown 
for nonbank claims has the same currency composition. Bank claims account for around ¾ of 
total other investment assets. 
For foreign exchange reserves, we use data from the U.S. Treasury (available at the link 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/20061119281827487.htm. 
External liabilities 
For foreign direct investment and portfolio equity investment in the United States, we assume 
that all liabilities are denominated in U.S. dollars.  
For portfolio debt liabilities, we use data published in the Report on Foreign Portfolio 
Holdings of U.S. Securities as of June 30, 2005 (http://www.treas.gov/tic/shl2005r.pdf). 
which provides the currency composition of long-term debt securities, and apply the same 
currency share to short-term debt securities. The currency shares are assumed to have 
remained constant between June and December 2005. 
For other investment liabilities, we use the reported currency breakdown between dollar and 
foreign currencies for claims reported by banks (Nguyen (2006), Table I) and assume that the 
breakdown for the remaining claims has the same currency composition. Claims on banks 
account for around 70 percent of total other investment liabilities.  35 
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Table 1. Direction of Trade in Goods, 1984 and 2004 
      1984     
           
Trading Partner→  
 
Country/Region ↓ 





           
Euro Area  8  4 1.1 1.6 12.4  26.9
    
United States  3.3  2.1 2.2 6.6  14.2
    
Japan 2.9  6.9 6.1 8.3  24.2
           
Emerging Asia  5.7  9.3 8.5 8.6  32.5
           
      2004     
           
Trading Partner→  
 
Country/Region ↓ 





           
Euro Area  8.6  3.9 1.2 4.2 11.8  29.8
    
United States  4.1  1.6 4.8 9.6  20
    
Japan 3.2  4.1 10 4.5  21.8
    
Emerging Asia  12  12 11.4   14.8  51.1
1/ Includes Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom as euro area partner 
countries, and these 5 countries plus the euro area as trading partners for other countries and regions.  
Note: Bilateral exports and imports as a ratio of country/region’s domestic GDP. For the euro area, the 
Europe category excludes intra-euro area trade. Sum of regions does not add to total, due to unallocated 
trade. Source: authors’ calculations based on IMF Direction of Trade Statistics. Emerging Asia includes 
China, Hong Kong S.A.R., India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan province of 
China, and Thailand.  
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.  40 
Table 2. Evolution of Net Foreign Assets, 2002–2005: Underlying Factors 2002–2005 
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Euro Area  -7.2 -7.2 3.3 -2.0 -9.2  2.7  -1.9
Japan  32.5  0.8 5.7 7.1 -7.4 -2.9 -1.7
United States  -23.8  2.3 -20.6 0.9 17.2 4.5 0.4
          
 
1/ Cumulative capital account transfers and errors and omissions. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics, national data, and Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).  41 
Table 3. Capital Gains on External Portfolios in the Euro Area and the United States,  
2002–2005 
  Euro Area        United States 
         
 Assets       Assets 












2002  -7.5 -26.5 -11.5 -16 20.9 -15.8  -19.3
2003 0.1  18.8 1.1 -17 18.0 43.0  28.0
2004 1.3 8.9  -1.4 -7.3 11.4 19.1  11.2
2005 8.3  21.3 3.5 15.5 -2.4 15.2  6.5
      
  Liabilities Liabilities 









2002 3.9  -21.3  -0.1 1.4 -18.3  -24.2
2003  -1.9 6.0 8.7 -1.6 35.3  18.1
2004 4.5 7.3 2.5 -0.6 12.7  5.8
2005 6.0  20.7 1.1 -7.6 4.7  1.3
Note: Rate of capital gains in euro on foreign assets and liabilities of the euro area; Rates of capital 
gains in dollars on foreign assets and liabilities of the United States. Source: authors’ calculations 
based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). 
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Table 4. Currency Composition of Net External Position, 2005  
(percent of GDP) 









China 12.5 -28.3 29.2  11.6
Euro Area  -15.0 -65.5 16.8  34.5
Japan 35.9 -26.9 38.5  21.9
United States  -21.5 (-74.8) -74.8  53.4
Source: authors’ calculations (see Appendix 2). 
 
  43 
Table 5. Net Foreign Assets and Capital Gains, Adjustment Scenarios: 
Effects of Exchange Rates and Asset Prices 
 China  Euro  Area Japan  United  States 
      
Net foreign assets, 2005 (pct of GDP)  12.5  -15.0  35.9  -21.5 
Financial openness, 2005 (pct of GDP) 1/  95.9  269.7  163.8  196.8 
      
Baseline       
Net foreign assets, 2008 (pct of GDP)  24.0  -16.3  34.3  -33.5 
PV of capital gains/losses by 2008 (pct of 2005 GDP)  -4.0  -3.5  -8.6  2.1 
of which: exchange rate-related capital gains  -3.0  -4.3  -8.1  0.4 
      
Net foreign assets, 2015 (pct of GDP)  26.1  -14.4  38.0  -43.4 
PV of capital gains/losses by 2015 (pct of 2005 GDP)  -18.4  -5.5  -16.3  8.4 
of which: exchange rate-related capital gains  -12.4  -7.6  -16.0  3.9 
       
Policies scenario       
Net foreign assets, 2008 (pct of GDP)  21.9  -15.8  33.9  -30.9 
PV of capital gains/losses by 2008 (pct of 2005 GDP)  -5.2  -3.6  -9.3  3.7 
of which: exchange rate-related capital gains  -4.2  -3.9  -8.4  1.8 
      
Net foreign assets, 2015 (pct of GDP)  15.3  -14.4  32.4  -24.5 
PV of capital gains/losses by 2015 (pct of 2005 GDP)  -17.1  -6.7  -17.5  10.0 
of which: exchange rate-related capital gains  -10.7  -6.5  -15.0  4.0 
      
Disruptive scenario       
Net foreign assets, 2008 (pct of GDP)  15.5  -18.0  23.6  -24.7 
PV of capital gains/losses by 2008 (pct of 2005 GDP)  -16.0  -4.1  -17.2  6.9 
of which: exchange rate-related capital gains  -15.1  -5.0  -16.1  5.1 
1 / Sum of external assets and liabilities (in percent of GDP).  
Note: exchange-rate-related capital gains are calculated by excluding the effects of economic growth 
on the value of portfolio equity assets and liabilities  44 
Table 6a. European Countries: Bilateral Trade Patterns, 2004 






Rest of the 
World 
Total
Austria 69.4  3.2 1.0 2.8 5.8  82.2
Belgium 128.0  10.1 3.3 8.1 19.2  168.7
Finland 40.0  3.0 1.3 4.5 11.8  60.7
France 32.1  2.6 0.7 2.4 7.1  45.1
Germany 40.7  4.8 1.5 5.2 7.2  59.4
Greece 21.0  1.5 0.8 2.7 7.1  33.1
Ireland 60.7  15.9 2.6 5.8 6.1  91.1
Italy 27.0  2.4 0.7 1.9 10.2  42.2
Netherlands 81.9  7.0 2.5 11.5 14.2  117.2
Portugal 43.3  2.1 0.6 1.5 6.7  54.2
Spain 32.1  1.5 0.7 2.3 7.8  44.3
Denmark 45.5  2.7 1.2 3.9 5.6  58.9
Norway 39.8  3.7 1.1 2.7 4.9  52.2
Sweden 48.1  4.8 1.3 3.8 6.5  64.4
Switzerland 48.3  5.3 2.0 5.0 6.3  66.9
United Kingdom  21.5  4.4 1.0 4.0 6.5  37.4
Central and 
Eastern Europe 
59.1 2.3 1.2 4.3 11.6  78.4
Note: (Exports+Imports)/GDP. Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.  45 
Table 6b. Trade Weights in Multilateral Real Exchange Rates 
 Europe United 
States
Asia Rest  of 
the world
Austria   0.78 0.08 0.07  0.07
Belgium-Luxembourg 0.78 0.09 0.08  0.06
Finland   0.64 0.09 0.12  0.14
France   0.72 0.1 0.1  0.08
Germany   0.68 0.11 0.11  0.09
Greece   0.72 0.08 0.07  0.14
Ireland   0.64 0.21 0.1  0.05
Italy   0.69 0.11 0.1  0.1
Netherlands   0.81 0.07 0.07  0.05
Portugal   0.82 0.08 0.05  0.04
Spain   0.78 0.07 0.07  0.08
Denmark   0.76 0.08 0.1  0.06
Sweden   0.69 0.13 0.1  0.08
United Kingdom   0.61 0.18 0.12  0.09
CEEC 0.8 0.05 0.05  0.1
Japan   0.28 0.29 0.32  0.11
United States   0.32 0 0.26  0.42
Note: “Double export” weights from European Commission’s basket of 41 major trading 
partners for 2004.  46 
Table 7. Net Dollar Exposures  
(in percent of GDP), 2004 








Austria 1.6 5.6 3.1 -3.0  2.2
Belgium 5.0 3.9 17.1 -2.2  7.9
Finland 4.1 3.7 4.7 -3.0  0.8
France 8.9 5.7 0.1 -4.4  3.9
Germany 7.7 2.5 4.4 4.3  4.2
Greece 0.6 0.9 0.4   0.8
Ireland 10.4 -9.6  68.8
Italy 1.6 4.1 0.2 -2.4  1.4
Luxembourg 1.1 97.2  27.0
Netherlands 22.6 30.9 31.0 2.5  16.0
Portugal 1.1 1.2 1.1 -3.1  1.3
Spain 4.5 1.2 10.3 -1.7  6.8
Denmark 7.7 8.0 21.9   9.8
Sweden 6.3 7.7 20.3 -12.9  10.3
United Kingdom  10.8 16.0 9.7 -21.6  22.9
Norway 16.1 11.7 29.9   2.3
Switzerland 2.0 13.1 32.2 9.4  11.0
Note: Methodology to calculate dollar exposures is described in section IV. Net dollar positions 
of banks (excluding securities, where possible) are calculated from data reported by national 
central banks (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom, Switzerland)(awaiting responses from the other central 
banks).  47 
Table 8. Impact of ‘Disruptive’ Dollar Shock 







Austria  -0.3 -1.1 -0.6 0.6 
Belgium  -1.0 -0.8 -3.4 0.4 
Finland  -0.8 -0.7 -0.9 0.6 
France  -1.8 -1.1 -0.03 0.9 
Germany  -1.5 -0.5 -0.9 -0.9 
Greece  -0.1 -0.2 -0.1   
Ireland  -2.1  1.9 
Italy  -0.3 -0.8 -0.05 0.5 
Luxembourg  -0.2    -19.4 
Netherlands  -4.5 -6.2 -6.2 -0.5 
Portugal  -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.6 
Spain  -0.9 -0.2 -2.1 0.3 
Denmark  -1.5 -1.6 -4.4  
Sweden  -1.3 -1.5 -4.1 2.6 
United Kingdom  -2.2 -3.2 -1.9 4.3 
Norway  -3.2 -2.3 -6.0   
Switzerland  -0.4 -2.6 -6.4 -1.9 
Note: Impact effect (percent of GDP) of an unanticipated 20 percent dollar depreciation 
against the euro, consistent with ‘disruptive’ scenario in section III.  48 





Net equity  Net debt
        
Austria 1.3 -18.4 2.6  -21.0
Belgium 1.8 28.1 8.7  19.4
Finland 2.6 -14.9 -16.3  1.4
France -1.8 7.0 17.4  -10.4
Germany 4.1 14.3 15.1  -0.9
Greece -8.0 -79.2 -20.5  -58.7
Ireland -0.8 -19.4 -236.1  211.4
Italy -1.5 -13.7 16.4  -30.1
Luxembourg 11.2 118.4 -2740.8  2869.5
Netherlands 6.4 -11.8 20.6  -32.4
Portugal -9.3 -64.6 -29.5  -35.1
Spain -7.4 -44.5 -6.7  -37.8
Denmark 3.2 1.1 21.8  -20.7
Norway 16.7 75.0 50.1  24.9
Sweden 6.6 -8.6 37.4  -46.0
Switzerland 13.8 93.1 6.7  86.3
United Kingdom  -2.6 -16.8 16.8  -33.7
Central and Eastern Europe  -4.6 -46.0 -38.5  -7.5
Note: Data for 2005 where available, 2004 otherwise (indicated by an asterisk). Central and 
Eastern Europe comprises Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. Sources: authors’ calculations based 
on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006a and World Economic Outlook database. 
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Appendix Table 1. Assumptions on the Composition of Capital Flows (2006–2015) 
  United States   
Type of flow  Assumptions  Avg value 
Direct investment abroad  Constant ratio of GDP   1.4% 
Portfolio equity investment abroad  Constant ratio of GDP   1.0% 
Portfolio debt investment abroad  Constant ratio of GDP   0.4% 
Other investment abroad  Constant ratio of GDP   2.5% 
Reserves none  0 
Direct investment in the country  Constant ratio of GDP   1.4% 
Portfolio equity invest. in the country  Constant ratio of GDP   1.0% 
Portfolio debt invest. in the country  Residual to ensure that net capital flows=CA balance  5.4% 
Other investment in the country  Constant ratio of GDP   2.5% 
    
  Euro Area   
Type of flow  Assumptions  Avg value 
Direct investment abroad  Constant ratio of GDP   2.5% 
Portfolio equity investment abroad  Constant ratio of GDP   1.5% 
Portfolio debt investment abroad  Residual to ensure that net capital flows=CA balance  3.2% 
Other investment abroad  Constant ratio of GDP   3.5% 
Reserves none  0.0% 
Direct investment in the country  Constant ratio of GDP   2.5% 
Portfolio equity invest. in the country  Constant ratio of GDP   1.5% 
Portfolio debt invest. in the country  Constant ratio of GDP   3.0% 
Other investment in the country  Constant ratio of GDP   3.5% 
    
  Japan   
Type of flow  Assumptions  Avg value 
Direct investment abroad  Constant ratio of GDP   1.0% 
Portfolio equity investment abroad  Constant ratio of GDP   1.0% 
Portfolio debt investment abroad  Residual to ensure that net capital flows=CA balance  2.8% 
Other investment abroad  Constant ratio of GDP   1.0% 
Reserves  Constant ratio of GDP   0.5% 
Direct investment in the country  Constant ratio of GDP   0.2% 
Portfolio equity invest. in the country  Constant ratio of GDP   1.0% 
Portfolio debt invest. in the country  Constant ratio of GDP   1.0% 
Other investment in the country  Constant ratio of GDP   1.0% 
    
  China   
Type of flow  Assumptions  Avg value 
Direct investment abroad  Gradually increasing ratio of GDP   0.6% 
Portfolio equity investment abroad  Gradually increasing ratio of GDP   0.5% 
Portfolio debt investment abroad  Gradually increasing ratio of GDP   0.4% 
Other investment abroad  Constant ratio of GDP   0.8% 
Reserves  Residual to ensure that net capital flows=CA balance  8.0% 
Direct investment in the country  Gradually declining ratio of GDP   3.0% 
Portfolio equity invest. in the country  Constant ratio of GDP from 2007  0.9% 
Portfolio debt invest. in the country  Gradually increasing ratio of GDP   0.4% 
Other investment in the country  Constant ratio of GDP   0.9% 
Note: the average value for the residual category of capital flows changes across scenarios (because the 
current account balances change). The reported value corresponds to the baseline scenario.  50 
 
Figure 1. Current Account Balances, Major Regions, 1997–2005 
(percent of world GDP) 
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Note: Emerging Asia group includes: Hong Kong S.A.R., India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan province of China, and Thailand. The Europe group includes the 12 
euro area countries plus Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. The oil exporters’ group includes: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Republic of 
Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Yemen. 
Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics.  51 
Figure 2. Current Account Balances: Europe versus the United States 

















Note: the chart depicts current account balances in percent of each region’s GDP. Aggregate Europe 
includes the 12 euro area countries plus Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
United Kingdom. Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics. 
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Figure 3. Current Account: Aggregate Balance of Europe, Japan, and United States 
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Note: the chart depicts the aggregate current account balance of the two country groups, scaled by 
their combined GDP. Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics. 
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Figure 4. Net Foreign Asset Positions: Europe and the United States 















Source: authors’ calculations based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) and national data. 54 
Figure 5. The International Financial Integration of Europe 




























Financial integration with the United States 
(right scale)
 
Note: International financial integration is defined as the sum of foreign assets and liabilities (as a 
ratio to GDP) for a group of European countries, including intra-European cross-holdings. Financial 
integration with the United States is the sum of U.S.-located foreign assets and liabilities (as a ratio to 
GDP) for this group of countries. Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006a) and other sources 
described in Section II.  55 
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Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook, September 2006 and authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 7. Europe’s Current Account Balances  
(percent of GDP) 
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Source: IMF, Balance of Payments Statistics.  57 
Figure 8. Europe’s Net Foreign Assets  
(percent of GDP) 
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Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). 
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